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LONG-TERM PROSPECTS—AN APPRAISALCHAPTER XVII
THE PUSH AND PULL OF MARKET FORCES
AN ATTEMPT was made in preceding chapters to identify, in quantita-
tive form where possible, the strategic factors that over the past sixty
years have determined long-term economic growth in an important
sector of the economy. What are the salient points of the analysis?
And what insight into the future course of capital formation and
financing in residential construction can be derived from this examina-
tion of the past? Before proceeding to answer these questions, it will
be well to state more specifically the purpose of this concluding part
of the study and the assumptions on which it is based.
In addition to summarizing the record of six decades, the objective
is to assess the present and future position of those forces which have
had a strategic influence on past capital formation and financing in
this field and to scan the horizon for the emergence of new factors that
may modify past experience. The appraisal for the most part will be
in qualitative rather than quantitative terms and must necessarily deal
with broad ranges of probabilities. It is hoped, nevertheless, that it
will provide materials useful for more specific projections and for
operational purposes of those holding long-term financial interests in
residential real estate. The period considered extends roughly to 1975.
This objective distinguishes the following observations sharply from
estimates of "housing needs" which have been prepared by government
agencies and private organizations and are often used for numerical
projections of capital or building materials requirements.' Estimates
of nonfarm housing needs compute the number of additional dwelling
units required over a period of time if every "family" (however de-
fined) is to have a unit of specified minimum standards. They typically
involve allowances for replacement of existing dwelling units falling
below these standards, as well as for the increase in nonfarm families,
normal demolition losses, and normal vacancy reserves. They are
1Cf.Housing Needs, National Housing Agency, National Housing Bulletin 1,
November 1944, and How Big Is the Housing Job?, Housing and Home Finance
Agency, October 1951; J. Frederick Dewhurst at at., America's Needs and Re-
sources, Twentieth Century Fund, 1947; and Robert W. Hartley et at., America's
Capital Requirements, Twentieth Century Fund, 1950. The last publication in-
cludes references to numerous other estimates of housing needs. Also, Resources
for Freedom, A Report to the President by the President's Materials Policy Com-
mission, June 1952, Vol. II, pp. 113-114, and Standards for Measuring Housing
Needs, 79th Cong., 2nd sess., Senate Small Business Committee, Senate Committee
Print No. 8. As to the quantitative importance of replacement of substandard
dwelling units in housing need estimates, see pp. 296-297.264 PUSH AND PULL OF MARKET FORCES
normative and programmatic in nature and indeed depend on sub-
stantial government action for their realization.
Nor is the objective here to provide a numerical forecast of the
volume of capital formation and financing in residential real estate to
1975. Such a forecast would involve, among other things, making a set
of specific assumptions as to changes in nonfarm population and gross
national product—a task beyond the scope of this study of one sector
of the economy. And even if one were bold enough to select one or
several projections of population and GNP as starting points, he could
not ignore the complexity of factors impinging upon residential capital
formation and the variety of alternative developments that might occur
even at given levels of population and total product—alternatives
which will be considered in this chapter. This concluding part of the
study, therefore, offers no more than reflections which should illuminate
the forces likely to determine capital formation and financing in resi-
dential real estate and, in this fashion, should provide leads for more
adequate projections.
Even without numerical forecasts, any attempt to glean prospects
for the future from the record of past experience rests, of course, upon
the assumption of a high degree of continuity in the political, social,
and economic life of the nation. Waiving a discussion of the intriguing
general aspects of such an assumption,2 some confidence in its validity
can be gained from observation of the past. Two gigantic wars inter-
vened during the sixty years covered by this study. From a long-range
view, the wars and their aftermaths, so far as they are now observable,
modified but did not upset the operation of the basic forces analyzed
in this volume. The wars may have been largely or partly responsible
for the duration and amplitude of fluctuations in building activity.
Internal migrations associated with the wars may have affected the
locational distribution of new construction. World War II may have
given further impetus to the development of federal government aids
to private residential building, which carried over into the postwar
period; and rent control may have influenced the composition if not
the level of housing construction.
But viewing the over-all pattern, one cannot help being impressed
by the continuity in the face of overwhelming events rather than by
discontinuity. Continuity expresses itself in the broad relationships
outlined in this volume, such as the basic long-term interconnection
between population growth and additions to the housing stock, the
declining size and changed composition of the household, the drop in
2Theseaspects are admirably stated in Simon Kuznets' Foreword to The Role
of Federal Credit Aids in Residential Construction, by Leo Grebler (National
Bureau of Economic Research, Occasional Paper 39, 1953).PUSH AND PULL OF MARKET FORCES 265
realcapital per new dwelling unit, the declining relative importance
of residential construction in total economic activity, the increasing
willingness of consumers to use mortgage loans for the acquisition of
new homes, and the spectacular development of the financial system
to meet the needs of debt financing for this purpose.
In spite of all the changes in household size and composition, no
communal forms of living have developed that would represent a
revolutionary break in the basic desire of people to organize them-
selves into small social units in one dwelling unit. Although urbaniza-
tion and suburbanization, and more recently the activity of govern-
ment, have wrought important changes, no completely new processes
or institutional arrangements for the building and financing of houses
have been devised. Popular expectations during World War II that the
postwar era would usher in a bright new world of machine-produced
houses did not come true. Even the postwar housing shortage and
the strenuous efforts of the federal government to stimulate residential
construction did not restore the share of house building in total eco-
nomic activity to the level reached in the twenties. Government
insurance or guarantee of mortgages, probably the most potent innova-
tion in this field, is in fact an adaptation of an earlier device, mortgage
guarantee by private institutions. Thus the assumption of a high degree
of continuity appears to be sufficiently realistic for a broad, forward-
looking view.
The following appraisal of long-term prospects does not consider the
possible effects of another major war, nor does it consider the possibility
of "cold war" of such intensity that the community at large, to minimize
risks from atomic warfare, will enter upon large-scale relocation of its
population and economic activities within a relatively short period.
Such a decision obviously would involve a drastic reallocation of re-
sources and might alter all past relationships and trends.
This assessment assumes that the American economy will be capable
of raising domestic standards of living even in the presence of con-
tinuing high military and foreign aid expenditures. While not predi-
cated upon full employment, it anticipates that policies aimed at
maintenance of full employment will be operative and that these will
have a direct impact on government activity in residential construction
and its financing. Full employment may be accomplished in many ways,
but, in the absence of major wars, it is hardly conceivable that full
employment policies will not encompass direct governmental stimula-
tion of residential construction, either privately or publicly financed
or both.266 PUSH AND PULL OF MARKET FORCES
A Declining Outlet for Investment?
The findings in this volume suggest that residential gross capital
formation in real terms has grown at a declining rate (Chapter III).
Net capital formation in real terms experienced a slow growth from the
first to the second of the three major swings observed since 1889 and a
sharp absolute decline from the second to the third (Chapter IV). The
magnitudes of change have probably been influenced by the fact that
the last of the three periods, 1925-1950, included World War II as well
as the Great Depression. Nevertheless, a pattern of declining or arrested
growth has appeared—a pattern also found in the rate of increase in
the value of the housing stock at constant prices and in the ratio of new
dwelling units built to the inventory of existing units. Moreover, except
in the twenties, residential construction expenditures in relation to
total gross capital formation and to GNP have fallen more or less
persistently (Chapter IX).
Do these findings point toward a further decline in the rate of capital
growth in this sector of the economy, and to a further relative displace-
ment of residential construction as an outlet for private investment (in
real terms)? Or is it possible to discern market forces that will arrest
or reverse past trends? Will intensification of existing or the introduc-
tion of new government aids modify thee trends? And what effects
would a continued decline in the rate of real capital growth have on
the demand for capital funds originating in residential real estate?
Answers to these questions obviously are important not only to those
who are directly interested in the production and financing of new
housing construction but also for judgments as to the future course of
total economic activity or total investment. If there is strong reason to
believe that there will be a continuing downward trend in the ratios of
residential construction to gross capital formation and gross national
product, then there will also be reason to anticipate that the role of
residential building in stimulating or maintaining high levels of general
economic activity will be reduced. The diminished contribution of resi-
dential construction would need to be offset by larger shares of other
components of capital formation or by a greater share of consumer
expenditures in GNP.
Just as it was useful in the analysis of past performance to distin-
guish between the forces determining the number of dwelling units
built and those determining average real capital per dwelling unit, it
will be desirable to appraise future prospects in the same terms. This
appraisal will first encompass basic market forces, including those
usually subsumed under "demographic" factors, and then deal with
government programs as a modifying influence (Chapter XVIII).PUSH AND PULL OF MARKET FORCES 267
Historical Forces Affecting the Number of Dwelling Units
Projections of either the need or the demand for housing are com-
monly based on population projections, on the ground that there is a
basic long-term relationship between increase in population and net
additions to the housing stock. The empirical evidence discussed in
Chapter V does not invalidate the soundness of this assumption, but it
reveals the great complexity of the relationship. Even if a single popu-
lation projection can be accepted, the number of additional dwelling
units may vary widely depending not only on the age and family
composition of the population, but also on changes in people's attitudes
toward organizing themselves in households. These attitudes, in turn,
respond to changes in per capita real income, among other things.
The potency of these factors was illustrated in Chapter V, where a
potential maximum of 55 million nonfarm households in 1950 was
calculated as against 37.4 million actually in existence. Moreover, the
relationship between growth in households and net additions to the
housing stock does not necessarily hold for new dwelling units. As was
evidenced by the data for the two decades 1930 to 1950, conversions
of existing housing units can be an important source of net additions
to the supply.
An even more basic difficulty has been revealed by recent work on
defects of past population projections and on the underlying assump-
tions and techniques.3 This work raises serious doubt as to whether
single population estimates can be used as a basis for projecting either
housing need or housing demand over any long span of time.4 The
"population" basis is much less secure than housing analysts have been
prone to admit.
The great variations in the number of households that may be created
in the two and a half decades from 1950 to 1975 are illustrated in Table
75, which uses four nonfarm population projections based on projec-
tions of total population by the Bureau of the Census, and three pro-
jections of changes in the average size of nonfarm households. On this
basis, results are obtained which vary from 55.8 to 71.7 million nonfarm
households in 1975. The highest value in this range is almost 30 per cent
above the lowest value. The increase in nonfarm households from 1950
Cf. three works by Joseph S. Davis: "Our Amazing Population Upsurge,"
Journal of Farm Economics, November 1949, pp. 765-778; "The Population Up-
surge in the United States," Food Research Institute, Stanford, California, War-
Peace Pamphlet 12, December 1949; and "Our Changed Population Outlook and
Its Significance," American Economic Review, June 1952, pp. 304-325. Also Simon
Kuznets, "An Experiment in Projection," mimeographed, National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, Work Memorandum 33, 1952.
The estimates mentioned in footnote 1 are based on single population pro-
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to 1975 varies from 18.7 to 34.6 million. The highest value within the
range would be almost 100 per cent above the lowest value, and the
number of additions to the stock of dwelling units (not considering
demolitions and similar deductions from the stock), could average from
748,000 to 1,384,000 per year during this twenty-five-year period.
Thus the "demographic" basis for long-term projections of housing
demand—which, of course, implies a great many economic forces—
turns out to be slippery at best and nonexistent at worst. Nevertheless,
some judgments can be expressed about the probable strength of forces
operating on the size and number of households. It seems reasonable to
expect that an increasing fragmentation of social units forming house-
holds will prevail, as it did in the past. Many factors operate in this
direction: continued urbanization; the likely further decrease in age
at time of marriage; the adoption of culture patterns dominant among
white natives by sons and daughters of immigrants; the increase in
longevity coupled with the desire of older persons to maintain their
own households; social security and pension programs which make it
increasingly possible for retired persons to do so; the tendency of single
adults in younger age groups to establish a household either indi-
vidually or in small groups; and, perhaps as the most important force
permitting an increasingly larger number of households from a given
population, a rise in real per capita income.
If these expectations are correct, two tendencies significant for the
demand for dwelling units are likely to develop. One of these is an
increase in the proportion of households other than biological families,
Even for a shorter period, 1950-1960, a projection of the number of households
(farm and nonfarm) by the Bureau of the Census arrives at greatly varying results.
The projected increase in the number of households from 1950 to 1960 varies as
follows (Projections of the Number of Households and Families, 1955 and 1960,




The high projection is almost double the low projection. But projections through
1960 are simple compared with those extending over a longer period. For nearly
all of the persons who will be heads of households in 1960 were already at least
ten years old in 1950. Projections into the more distant future require assumptions
as to births as well as many other assumptions.
6Theeffect of increased longevity and rising desire and ability of older persons
to maintain separate living quarters may be illustrated by a schematic example of
the life cycle of a typical family. Assuming an average age at marriage of 23 years,
a period of seven years may be allowed as stage I for the new family to expand to
full force, including children. An additional 20 to 25 years may elapse in stage II,
in which the children live with the parents. Stage III, in which the "family" shrinks
to a two-person household, would begin 25 to 30 years after marriage. With average
longevity of 60 years, stage III would be 5 to 10 years. With average longevity of
75 years, stage III would be 15 to 20 years.PUSH AND PULL OF MARKET FORCES 269
TABLE75
Illustration of Nonfarm Population and Household Projections
for 1975, on Varying Assumptions
(millions of persons or households)
ACTUAL, 1950 Series AA
ASSUMED, 1975
Series ASeries BSeries C
Total population 151 229 222 215 207
Nonfarm population 128 208 200 193 184
Number of nonfarm households
At 3.44 persons per household 37.1 .. .. .. ..
At 3.3 " " " .. 63.0 60.6 58.5 55.8
At 3.1 "" " .. 67.1 64.5 62.3 59.4
At 2.9 "" "
.. 71.7 69.0 66.6 63.4
Increase in number of nonfarmhouseholds,1950-1975












At 2.9"" " .. 34.6 31.9 29.5 26.3
a Thedata for total population are illustrative projections of the Bureau of the Census
(Current Population Reports, Series P-25, No. 123). To arrive at illustrative projections
of nonfarm population, a device suggested by Margaret J. Hagood, after experimentation
with several alternatives, was used: a simple geometric curve resulting from the annual
rate of decrease in farm population from 1916 to 1950. This method yields a farm
population of about 22 million in 1975 as against roughly 24 million reported in the 1950
Census of Population. The figure of 22 million was used with the two medium estimates
of total population and adjusted to 23 million for the low and to 21 million for the high
estimate of total population, on the assumption of a slight inverse relationship between
changes in the sizes of farm population and total population. Mrs. Hagood of the Bureau
of Agricultural Economics and Jacob S. Siegel and Paul C. Glick of the Bureau of the
Census have been most helpful in the construction of this table, but the specific figures
used are not attributable to them individually or to the federal agencies mentioned.
or husband-wife households. As was pointed out in Chapter V, almost
one-quarter of all occupied nonfarm dwelling units were absorbed in
1950 by these "other households," including those of individuals. With
a rise in real income and a continuance of the social attitudes observed
during past decades, the relative importance of "other households" in
the number of additional households formed between now and 1975
may increase at a spectacular rate. As an illustration, the household
projections of the Bureau of the Census for 1950-1960 involve an
increase of "other households" by almost 30 per cent and of the sub-
category "primary individuals" (occupying a separate dwelling unit)
by 38 per cent, as against a gain of only 13 per cent for husband-wife
families. Almost two-fifths of the projected rise in the total number of
nonfarm households is assigned to "other households."
Ibid., Table 5, "medium estimate." These specific relationships may be partly
due to the projected low marriage rate for 1950-1960 resulting from the low birth
rates of the thirties, but they reflect also an allowance by the estimators for the270 PUSH AND PtJLL OF MARKET FORCES
The second tendency, related to the first, is a further decline in the
average size of the nonfarm household. During the first half century,
as was shown in Chapter V, the average population per nonfarm
household dropped 20 per cent. During the three decades from 1920 to
1950, alone, the average fell more than 18 per cent. A further decline
from the 1950 average of 3.44 persons to 3.1 in 1975, the medium
projection used in Table 75, would imply an average annual percentage
reduction of .40, compared with .61 from 1920 to 1950, that is, would
be consistent with the assumption of a slowing up in the rate of
decline of average household size. It is clear from the earlier observa-
tions that the expectation of a continued shrinkage in the average size
of household does not rest solely on a projected decline in the number
or rate of births. It is, in fact, compatible with stable or increasing
births and birth rates provided the forces operating toward a growth
in households other than husband-wife combinations are sufficiently
strong.
In the past six decades these forces apparently were insufficient to
produce a rising or even constant rate of increase in the number of
households, in the face of a sharply declining rate of population
growth. As was indicated in Chapter V, the rate of household growth
as well as the rate of population growth has shown a secular decline
during the past half century, although the decline was much slower
for households than for population. It would be rash to conclude, how-
ever, that a continued decline in the rateofhousehold growth must of
itself arrest any further increases in the level of additions to the housing
stock. The historical record demonstrates that absolute increments
to the number of households have risen—from 6.2 million in 1890-1910
to 9.2 million in 1910-1930 and 13.8 million in 1930-1950. If additions
to households should approximate even the lowest of the illustra-
tive projections for 1950 to 1975 in Table 75, the increment would
again be larger than for any previous comparable period.8
In conclusion, the probable continuing decline in the rate of growth
of households does not necessarily have ominous implications for the
level of total housing demand in terms of dwelling units. The number
of additional households between 1950 and 1975 is likely to exceed
any increment on record.
forces described earlier in the text, as is apparent from the basic assumptions stated
in the Bureau of the Census report. During the 1940-1950 decade, husband-wife
households increased 27.7 per cent and "other households" only 13.8 per cent.
The gain in the number of "primary individuals" was 37.0 per cent. Ibid.
8Ona pro rata basis, the lowest projection of 18.7 million additional house-
holds for the period 1950 to 1975 would be equivalent to about 15 million for the
two decades 1950-1970, as against 13.8 million for 1930-1950.PUSH ANDPULLOF MARKET FORCES 271
New Forces Affecting the Number of Dwelling Units
This conclusion is reinforced by examination of several factors which
will probably tend to raise the level of net additions to the housing
stock over and above the level of increments to households. One of
these is internal nonfarm migration.9 Another is a more-than-propor-
tional increase in the number of seasonal dwellings. A third and more
dubious factor is the advancing age of the nonfarm housing stock. A
fourth possibility is a change in the consumer's scale of preferences in
favor of housing.
As was observed in Chapter VI, there is no evidence that internal
nonfarm migration (including the movement to suburbs) in the past
has raised the long-run level of total construction significantly, although
it has been an important factor in the geographical distribution of
new housing. In the future, however, the relative importance of internal
migration for the level of housing demand will probably increase.
Internal migration may create large, persistent pockets of vacancies in
areas of outmigration, leading ultimately to abandonment and demoli-
tion of nonfarm dwellings. To the extent that such vacancies occur, the
number of additional dwelling units at any level of market demand
will exceed the number built without migration to accommodate a
population of a given age and household composition. To date, popula-
tion growth from other sources in most nonfarm areas of outmigration
has apparently been enough to preclude such pockets, at least if entire
urban communities rather than specific districts in cities are con-
sidered. If, as seems likely, the rate of nonfarm population growth
declines at a somewhat more rapid rate,1° natural population growth
combined with smaller household size in many nonfarm areas may no
longer fill the gaps created by outmigration.
Assuming continued high mobility among the nonfarm population,
then, internal migration can be expected to raise the level of net addi-
tions to the housing stock. Similarly, a sustained or accelerated exodus
of city families to the suburbs would leave vacancies in the urban
9 Immigration from other countries and farm-city migration are already accounted
for in any projection of nonfarm population that may be used for estimates of future
housing demand.
10 It may be noted that all four of the illustrative projections of 1975 nonfarm
population given in Table 75 are consistent with such an expectation. The average
arithmetic annual rate of increase from 1950 to 1975 would be 2.50 per cent for
Series AA, 2.25 per cent for Series A, 2.03 per cent for Series B, and 1.75 per cent
for Series C. These rates based on a twenty-five-year period are higher than would
have been obtained if average annual rates could have been derived on the basis
of decade rates of growth, as in Table 23. But even on a twenty-five-year basis the
indicated rate of increase in any of the projections is as low as or lower than the
average annual rate of growth in each of the decades from 1890 to 1950, except
for the 1930-1940 period (Table 23).272 PUSH ANDPULLOF MARKET FORCES
housing stock, which may not be filled by immigration to the cities, and
would thus increase the volume of residential construction.
Second, the traditional notion of a maximum of one dwelling unit per
nonfarm household may need to be revised if per capita real income
continues to advance in the long run. As consumption standards rise
it is not at all unreasonable to expect a sharply increasing number of
families and other households to have more than one dwelling unit for
their use. The summer or week-end home has become increasingly
popular among higher income groups, particularly families residing in
large metropolitan areas, and the number of tourist cabins and seasonal
cottages for rent has increased rapidly. According to the Housing
Censuses of 1940 and 1950, the number of seasonal dwelling units in
nonfarm areas that were vacant at the time of enumeration rose from
593,652 to 1,097,000 between these dates. The growing emphasis on
leisure and recreation in an advanced urban society will probably
further increase these types of facilities.'
The increasing age of the nonfarm housing stock, under certain
conditions, may also tend to raise the level of net additions to the stock.
Compared with older countries, however, the average age of existing
dwelling units in the United States is remarkably low. The median age
of urban dwelling units was 25.4 years in 1940 and 28.7 years in 1950;
the median age of rural nonfarm dwelling units was 20.2 years in 1940
and 23.0 years in 1950.12
During the period to 1975, increasing age of the housing stock is not
likely to affect substantially the level of additions to the housing stock.
For residential structures, if kept in good repair, have such long physi-
cal and economic life that demolition because of physical deterioration
or obsolescence has been rare—an observation reflected in the depre-
ciation charge used in this study for estimates of capital consumption
(Appendix E). Historically, residential structures have been demolished
primarily to make way for other buildings, either residential or non-
residential, as in the case of single-family houses that are razed to be
replaced by apartment houses or office buildings, or to make way for
public improvements such as bridges and highways. The locations in
11Someof the increase in seasonal dwellings involves conversion of farmhouses
to the nonfarm category rather than new construction. Nevertheless, the building
of new vacation and week-end houses has expanded rapidly. Seasonal dwellings
under present statistical procedures are included in current reports on the number
of dwelling units started if they meet certain specifications. Otherwise, they should
be included in "nonhousekeeping" residential construction expenditures. Since the
above observations are not quantitative, the statistical treatment is immaterial. The
growing importance of this component of residential construction may, however,
require more comprehensive statistical information.
12Censrss ofHousing 1940, Vol. II, General Characteristics, pp. 12-13, arid
Census of Housing 1950, Vol. I, General Characteristics, pp. 1-3.PUSH AND PULL OF MABKET FORCES 273
which such "supersession" of land use occurs are determined not so
much by the age of existing residential structures as by other factors—
greater value of the land in alternative uses, as a consequence of the
changing economic environment of an area; or topography, con-
venience, and other considerations influencing site selection for public
improvements. For example, a forty-year-old apartment house in one
area may be demolished for replacement by an office building, while
large numbers of eighty-year-old structures in another area continue
to be used for residential purposes. Thus there is no necessary or fixed
relationship between age of residential structures and their remaining
life expectancy, although supersession of land use has often occurred
in the older sections of cities typically containing older residential
buildings.
Whether the increasing age of the housing stock will result in a
higher rate of demolition (and ultimately raise the level of residential
construction) depends therefore largely on the expansion of other land
uses in the more central areas of cities and towns. Because of the
apparent decentralization of some of the nonresidential urban activities,
this expansion may decelerate.' On the other hand, the rate of demoli-
tions is likely to increase because of stricter enforcement of local
safety and sanitary laws against the many violations that typically
multiply as residential structures become older and obsolete in terms
of current minimum housing standards. Other factors inducing a higher
rate of demolitions are the expansion of highway construction through
built-up urban areas and government aids to urban redevelopment,
which will be discussed in Chapter XVIII.
A long, sustained rise in real income and a more even income
distribution might cause consumers to abandon the least desirable
housing facilities in favor of better accommodations and thus increase
the number of dwelling units withdrawn from the market. But histori-
cal experience is discouraging on this point. Real per capita income
rose substantially from 1890 to 1950, and inequalities of income dis-
tribution were reduced during at least the latter portion of this period.
Yet demolitions due to abandonment of undesirable housing have in all
probability been insignificant.14 If abandonment through the mid- 'Theinfluence of internal nonfarm migration and that of the increasing age of
the nonfarm housing stock on future net additions to the stock may in fact overlap,
with the result that their net effect would be less than the sum of both. For the
most probable areas of heavy outmigration are also characterized by a higher
median age of nonfarm dwelling units. In 1940 the latter was 29.3 for urban areas
and 26.6 for the rural nonfarm areas in the North, as against only 19.5 for the
urban areas and 13.9 for the rural nonfarm areas in the West.
14Cf.Leo Grebler, Housing Market Behavior in a Declining Area, Columbia
University Press, 1952, for a discussion of this point and of demolition experience
on the Lower East Side of Manhattan.274 PUSH AND PULL OF MARKET FORGES
twenties was impeded by the stream of immigrants who came to occupy
the bottom end of the housing supply, a similar role has since been
performed by Negroes moving into northern and western cities, and
by Puerto Ricans at least in the case of New York City, and this move-
ment is likely to continue for some time.
Finally, the level of demand for additional dwelling units might be
raised if the position of housing in the consumer's scale of preferences
were substantially improved. If such a radical departure from apparent
trends in consumers' tastes should occur, home owners and tenants
would be willing to exchange old for new dwelling units at a more
rapid and continuous pace. An accelerated exchange of old for new
products would involve a more rapid decline in prices for old dwellings
relative to those for new dwellings, with the ultimate prospect of
displacing the least desirable part of the housing stock altogether
because it would become worthless, or of making it available to groups
which otherwise could not afford separate dwelling units.
A change in consumers' attitudes toward housing could conceivably
be induced or strengthened by product innovation. Larger numbers of
households might trade old for new units if the latter were vastly
superior in design, style, location, or quality. In such an event, builders
would develop a "replacement market" like that for other durable
goods, in addition to the market hitherto served.15
In the light of historical experience, this would be a revolutionary
change in the character of the market for new residential construction.
For the data assembled in this volume suggest that the demand for
additional residentialfacilities from 1890 to 1950 approximately
equaled the growth in the number of households. In sixty years of
spectacular long-term rise in real income, housing apparently lost rather
than gained from changes in consumers' tastes as many new wants,
products, and services emerged which in fact constitute much of the
content of high levels of consumption. Substantial innovations in the
style, design, and quality of housing occurred, and yet they failed to
generate a "replacement market."
The possibility of a radical change in consumers' tastes in favor of
housing cannot be dismissed, of course. A more positive attitude of
consumers toward housing may develop as average hours of work con-
tinue their historical decline and leisure increases. Akeady, consumers
use greater leisure increasingly to build or improve homes or to con-
struct or remodel vacation or week-end cottages. A change in con-
15Thisviewpoint is expressed in numerous articles in builders' and architectural
journals. See for example, Robinson Newcomb, "Your Changing Market," NAHI3
Correlator, National Association of Home Builders, June 1952. Also, Gilbert Burck
and Sanford S. Parker, "The Insatiable Market for Houses," Fortune, February 1954.PUSH ANDPULLOF MARKETFORCES 275
sumers'preferences may be reinforced by growth of home ownership
and by new attitudes toward family size—if the attitudes apparent in
the 1946-1953 upsurge of second and third births signify a lasting
change.
These are possibilities rather than certainties, and there are factors
opposing radical change in consumers' preferences for housing. It can
hardly be anticipated that there will be no further development of new
goods and services which will compete for a place in the family budget.
Moreover, the position of housing in the budgets of large numbers of
consumers may have suffered from rent control during and after the
war. Tenants living in controlled apartments have become accustomed
to paying a much smaller proportion of income for rent than was cus-
tomary before the war and have adjusted their expenditures to this
pattern.
Greater leisure enlarges also the range of alternative uses of time—
for education, travel, hobbies, and recreation outside the house. Con-
sequently, gains in leisure may not automatically or necessarily create
a lasting positive change in consumers' attitudes toward housing.
Certainly, past advances in leisure do not appear to have had this effect.
As to product innovation, the question is whether recent and prospec-
tive technological advances and style changes are of an order different
from those experienced during the past sixty years. Is the new house
of today, designed as it is for highly mechanized household operations,
preferably on one floor, so different from older houses that consumers
will be induced to trade old for new units in any quantity and on a
continuous basis? Will air conditioning in new dwelling units become a
decisive factor in their favor? Is the house-building industry develop-
ing production and marketing methods substantially different from
those in the past? And at what price and rent levels relative to those
of old houses will the new products be put into the market?° All of
these items are in the realm of speculation. 'Sofar as cost and price reduction of new construction is concerned, a basic
difficulty has been pointed out by Ramsey Wood in his "Housing Needs and the
Housing Market," in Housing, Social Security, and Public Works (Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System, Postivar Economic Series, No. 6, June 1946,
pp. 18-19):
Proposals to reduce cost to the occupant by reducing particular component
costs overlook the important role played by capital values in regulating the amount
and kind of new housing added to the supply. It has already been pointed out that
new building takes place when the prices of existing houses are higher than the cost
of building new houses which consumers regard as comparable, and also that, when
building is under way, costs tend to rise to absorb the difference between the
market value of existing houses and the sum of the prices of the component re-
sources used in building comparable new houses. This behavior of the market, it
has been shown, stops building fairly soon because, when values have risen as276 PUSH AND PULL OF MARKETFORCES
In conclusion, internal migration and increasing demand for seasonal
dwelling units emerge as new forces which will probably raise the level
of additions to the housing stock. Whether the increasing age of the
stock will have similar effects to 1975 is much less certain. And above
all looms the uncertainty of changes in the consumer's scale of prefer-
ences In favor of housing.
Conversions vs. New Construction
One important question remains. Will the forces determining net
additions to the housing stock have their full impact on the construc-
tion of new dwelling units? As was observed in Chapter V. there has
been a notable change in the supply of additional dwelling units.
During the thirties and forties conversions emerged as an important
means of creating additional dwelling units. Future conversion poten-
tials may have a direct bearing on the construction of new dwelling
units. If they are great, the number of newly built units may be
reduced. If they are small, the number of newly built units may be
larger.
So far as the demand for converted dwelling units is concerned, two
sources may be distinguished for the sake of clarity. Much of the
demand of households other than those of the husband-wife or "bio-
logical family" type is for converted units—either because of their
typical proximity to central business districts in cities or because of
relatively low rents, or both. In fact, many of these households can
only be established if there is a supply of conveniently located con-
verted dwelling units available at relatively low rent. As was indicated
before, the demand for separate dwelling units by households of this
type is expected to increase in relative importance. On the other hand,
large numbers of husband-wife households have found accommodations
in converted units during the thirties and forties—although there are
no data on this point—because of the pressure for low rent units in the
high as incomes will permit, and costs have caught up with values, builders cannot
operate profitably.
'This process goes on whether the techniques of building and the conditions on
which houses are bought and paid for are changing or standing still. The introduc-
tion, at strategic times, of techniques and conditions which enable builders or
landlords to make new housing available at lower prices than would otherwise be
possible may give rise to building which would not have taken place under the
earlier circumstances, but the very process of making use of these advantages tends
to eliminate them. The market evaluates such advantages against the existing stock
of housing and the incomes prevailing in the community; comparable houses com-
mand comparable prices; and the cost of building approaches market value."
In other words, cost reductions in new construction are unlikely to cause families
to shift from existing housing. The latter would be revalued sufficiently to wipe out
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thirties and because of the housing shortage and rent control during
and after World War II. As real income rises in the long run, this
source of demand for conversions will probably become less important.
For the frequently inferior accommodations in converted units will be
less attractive than those in new or existing units designed originally
for separate household operation.
On the supply side, it is questionable whether the rate of conversions
prevailing from 1930 to 1950 can be continued for long. This rate was
possible because there was a large supply of older, relatively spacious
residential structures adaptable for conversion, primarily in the more
central areas of cities. Many of these have already been converted.
Many of. the dwelling units in newer rtructures are of such small size
and in such location that they do not lend themselves easily to conver-
sion. Moreover, progressive decontrol of rent is removing an important
incentive to convert.
The sharp increase in the level of conversions from 1930 to 1950 was
due in part to special conditions affecting both demand and supply:
a severe depression followed by a war of gigantic dimensions. Unless
similar conditions prevail in the next twenty to twenty-five years, con-
versions are most likely to decline in relative importance.
Forces Affecting Real Capital per Dwelling Unit
Because of all these factors, the failure of dwelling unit starts during
the 1925-1950 cycle to increase over the previous cycle cannot be
interpreted as a secular trend and mechanically projected into the
future. This failure was associated with an unusually large volume of
conversions, and both the high level of conversions and the failure of
new dwelling unit starts to exceed the previous cycle average can be
ascribed to the succession of the Great Depression and World War II.
The arrested growth in new construction was not due to a decline in
the level of net household formation, and projections of the increase
in households from 1950 to 1975 suggest that the number of new dwell-
ing units will be larger than the number built from 1925 to 1950.
Moreover, several new factors point to a somewhat higher volume of
new dwelling units relative to household growth.
Still another variable must be considered: the secular fall in real
expenditure per new dwelling unit, which was analyzed in Chapter
VII. The decline in real input per unit emerged as a major factor con-
tributing to the downward movement of real capital formation in resi-
dential real estate. It is important, therefore, to form judgments on the
likely future strength and weakness of the forces that have affected
real capital per dwelling unit in the past.278 PUSH ANDPULLOF MARKET FORCES
Among the forces operating to reduce real capital per dwelling unit,
further regional population shifts. to the South and West are among
the most certain probabilities. These would tend to lower real capital
per dwelling unit, although the differences between the West and
North seem to have narrowed recently in this respect.17
Whether the decline in the average size of new dwelling units will
continue is much more questionable, even assuming a further drop in
the average size of household. Because of high construction costs, the
existence of a sellers' market, and preferential financing for lower-
priced houses under the FHA mortgage insurance system, new housing
construction after World War II was characterized by a large propor-
tion of small dwelling unitS.'8 The shrinkage of dwelling units cannot
continue indefinitely, of course, and the cost reductions possible by
further shrinkage become progressively smaller because the cost of
certain expensive facilities and equipment items—such as bathrooms,
kitchens, and heating systems—does not fall proportionately. Con-
sumer reactions against the small size of single-family houses have
become quite pronounced.' For several years, moreover, the increasing
age of children born during the period of high births after World
War II will create pressure for larger dwelling units, at least under
favorable business conditions, because of the preference for separate
bedrooms for teen-agers. The increase from 1950 to 1960 in the number
of children ten to nineteen years old is estimated at about 41 per cent,
compared with a decline from 1940 to 1950 of almost 10 per cent in this
age group;2° and this is one of the fairly firm figures in population
projections. Real input per new dwelling unit will therefore be less
affected by declines in the average size of units than it was in the past.
As to the future movement in the relative price of new housing, it
appears that the historical forces making for an increase in the relative
price of construction have been so strong and persistent, and the signals
of change in this trend so weak, that the increase is likely to continue.
Among the complex factors acting to increase the cost of construction
are:the relative increase in building materials prices, especially
17Theaverage permit for all urban dwelling units in the Pacific division, 1946-
1951, was $6,960, compared with $7,171 for New England, $7,243 for the Middle
Atlantic states, $7,849 for the East North Central region, and $6,462 for the West
North Central states (Table 32).
18 In 1940, only 23 per cent of all new single-family detached houses had four
or fewer rooms; in the first half of 1950, 47 per cent were this small. The Materials
Use Survey, Housing and Home Finance Agency, 1952, p. 5.
19 "Relevant Considerations in Recent Home Purchases," unpublished report of
the Survey Research Center of the Institute for Social Research, University of
Michigan, June 1951.
20 Current Population Reports, Bureau of the Census, Series P-20, No. 42,
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lumber, the large share of wages in total cost, and the slower advances
in productivity in residential building operations as compared with the
rest of the economy. The prospects for drastic changes in these trends
are not encouraging. Upon a sober appraisal, no revolutionary materials
seem to be in the offing. The President's Materials Policy Commission
has expressed its views on this question as follows: "The Commission
has taken into account some improvement in design and methods of
using materials by a streamlined industry, but it does not assume total
replacement of one material by another by 1975, or any startling
changes in design or methods. A bolder approach could prove the more
accurate. Electronic air-conditioners, cheap wireless electrical power
transmission, a structural wall material with high insulating properties,
which could be made transparent or opaque at will, the use of solar
energy to heat and to cool our buildings—such developments could
revolutionize the use of building materials. Yet to assume these changes
when they are not yet in sight would be misleading."2"
As to construction methods, the Commission anticipates a growing
use of pre-assembled, prefinished, or packaged building components;
but this process has been in operation for some time: "If there is one
general trend which appears to be developing in all phases of the
building field, it is the trend toward the reduction of field labor by
supplying more and more packaged units which can be incorporated
into the building with a minimum of time and effort. The overworked
and abused term, prefabrication,is hardly correct for this trend
because it includes such diverse elements as prefitted and prefinished
door units, walls of houses,...largefabricated frame sections, pre-
assembled plumbing stacks, and the casting of concrete wall slabs on
the fiat ready to be upended into place in the building. All of these
diverse developments have the common aim of reducing the need for
high-priced field labor. Some involve new materials, some merely
involve different techniques."22 Thus, if the increase in the relative price
of new housing and the resulting tendency to economize are considered
in isolation, a further decline in real capital per dwelling unit seems
indicated.
The tendency of a larger percentage of lower income families to seek
and occupy new housing, fostered by government aids in the past
fifteen years and likely to be encouraged in the future, will operate in
the same direction. Since there are limits to a continued decline in the
size of dwelling units, and because of the pressures for new installations
and facilities in the dwelling unit (see below), this tendency will
21 Resources for Freedom, President's Materials Policy Commission, Vol.I,
June 1952, p. 147.
22 Resources for Freedom, Vol. IV, June 1952,p. 156.280 PUSH AND PULL OF MARKET FORCES
probably express itself in lower grade materials and reduced durability
of structures.
Considering the forces operating to raise real capital per dwelling
unit, it seems reasonable to expect that, barring a radical reduction in
the willingness or ability of consumers to pay for new housing, there
will be installations and innovations as substantial as those that oc-
curred during the past half century. Without engaging in visionary
anticipations, one can foresee air conditioning in an increasing propor-
lion of new homes and apartments—an item involving a considerable
increase in capital requirements. The finished recreation room in base-
ments will probably become more common as devices for piping enter-
tainment into the house, such as television, ate perfected. Houses and
apartments with more than one bathroom will be more common. These
examples are drawn from trends already apparent in high-priced,
single-family homes and apartment houses, and it has often been
observed that product innovations and improvements are introduced
first in high-priced and later applied to lower-priced lines.
It may be noted, however, that many of the installations charac-
teristic of the higher-priced house of today and likely to be found in
the typical house of tomorrow are consumer durables which statistically
are excluded from the construction value of dwelling units, regardless
of whether or not they are provided by the builder and included in
the price or rent of new dwelling units. Refrigerators, freezers, and
mechanical dishwashers are among the items in this category. An
increasing tendency to furnish these facilities in new housing thus
would not be reflected in construction expenditures. The continuum
from the structural elements of a house to equipment of this kind must
be more or less arbitrarily broken for statistical purposes, and much
of the growth in equipment provided by builders will be captured
in the consumer durables accounts rather than in construction ex-
penditures.
A further increase in per capita real income may tend to raise real
capital per dwelling unit, but this result is far from inevitable if the
past trend is any guide. While real capital per dwelling unit is re-
sponsive to changes in income under a given set of conditions, the fact
remains that the rise in real income over sixty years has been asso-
ciated with a decline in the average real value of new dwelling units.
Moreover, the per capita real value of the entire housing stock has
remained roughly constant in the face of pronounced increases in per
capita purchases of most other types of consumer goods (Chapter VIII).
Here again, a shift in the consumer's scale of preferences in favor of
housing may reverse the past trend toward declining real input per
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expenditures per new unit as well as in "uptrading" between old and
new dwellings, discussed earlier in this chapter. However, the ques-
tions that were raised before in regard to the probability of a drastic
revision in consumers' tastes apply here.
On the roughest balancing of the factors operating to increase and
those operating to reduce real capital per dwelling unit, it would appear
that the odds are in favor of a further decline, but the rate of decline
is likely to slow down substantially. This factor considered in isola-
tion—that is, disregarding the number of dwelling units built—would
tend to reduce somewhat the volume of real capital formation in resi-
dential construction.
Thus, whether real capital formation in new housekeeping residential
construction will continue to decline, as it did from the 1905-1925
cycle to the 1925-1950 cycle, depends on the balance of forces operat-
ing on the number of new dwelling units and the real input per unit.
A strong trend toward an increased number of dwelling units would
offset the probable decline in real expenditure per dwelling unit. As an
illustration, assume that real expenditures per unit drop 12.5 per cent
from 1950 to 1975, or at an average annual rate of about .50 per cent
as against the .67 per cent implied in the estimate of a 36.7 per cent
decline from the nineties to the post-World War II period. In this case,
expenditure per unit in constant prices would fall from roughly $3,700
in the late forties (Table J-1) to $3,200 in the early seventies, and
might average about $3,450 for the entire period. If the average annual
number of new dwelling units built from 1950 to 1975 were 750,000, or
the lowest of the range of new nonfarm households derived from
Table 75, the resulting construction expenditures in constant prices
would equal the comparable expenditures during the 1925-1950 cycle
(Table 6). An average of 750,000 new units per year would be 55 per
cent higher than the average for the 1925-1950 period (Table 2).
If the previous appraisal of forces impinging upon the number of
dwelling units built is realistic, such an increase is by no means impos-
sible and indeed quite probable. Even under optimistic assumptions as
to the number of dwelling units built and real input per unit, however,
the ratios of construction expenditures to CNP and gross capital forma-
tion are certain to continue their historical fall. The decline in these
ratios, it will be recalled, has not been limited to the period since 1925,
during which special circumstances may have affected the absolute
growth of real capital formation in residential real estate. The decline
has been persistent since 1890 (except for the twenties) and most
probably originated before then. Without engaging in projections of
economic aggregates, one can consider continuance of this trend a
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struction in the nation's total economic effort, however, is but a conse-
quence of a dynamic economy in which new goods and services are
developed and levels of total consumption increase beyond mere
necessities.23
Other Components of Capital Formation
It remains to explore briefly prospects for two other elements of capi-
tal formation in residential building: nonhousekeeping construction
and additions and alterations.
As was revealed in Chapter III, real capital formation in nonhouse-
keeping construction in the form of hotels, motels, tourist cabins, dormi-
tories, etc., has shown a significant decline both in absolute terms and
relative to housekeeping construction since the middle twenties. The
expansion of relatively inexpensive transient and recreational facilities
during the automobile era has failed to offset the decline in expensive
urban hotel construction, and a spectacular further increase in these
facilities would be required to change the recent trend.
Such an increase is by no means impossible. Not only is it safe to
assume that the number of nonhousekeeping accommodations will in-
crease, but it appears also from recent developments that their quality,
and therefore real capital requirements for these facilities, will advance
rapidly. The motor courts and motels constructed during the past few
years have shown a tendency toward the use of higher-grade materials,
better plumbing and heating equipment, and larger room size—a trend
toward luxury appointments reminiscent of an earlier phase of urban
hotel construction. Their services are no longer those of a "poor man's
good." With an increase in real income and the growing popularity of
recreation and automobile travel, this advance may well begin to
raise the importance of nonhousekeeping facilities in total residential
construction.
Finally, the proportion of expenditures for additions and alterations
to total residential capital formation is likely to increase in the future,
as it did in the past. Experience indicates that modernization and im-
provement of existing structures. have offered substantial opportunities
for capital investment, probably not fully captured in the official
estimates of expenditures for this purpose. In the future a much larger
housing stock will be susceptible to capital improvements. The rising
age of the housing inventory will also make for larger modernization
23 These long-term tendencies are usually ignored in projections of housing
demand based on past relationships between national income and expenditures for
new residential construction. Thus "The Insatiable Market for Houses" in the
February 1954 issue of Fortune is based on the assumption that the house-building
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expenditures. Advances in real income will operate in the same direc-
lion, for there is probably greater income elasticity for this type of
expenditure than for new construction. Progressive removal of rent
control, already in process for several years, will eliminate one of the
impediments to capital improvements in tenant-occupied dwellings.
These forces will probably more than offset the possible tapering off
of conversions (pages 276-277), expenditures for which are included
in expenditures for additions and alterations.
Additions and alterations will involve both the remodeling of existing
structures not yet brought up to standards generally accepted in
current new construction and improvements not yet generally incor-
porated in such construction. The findings of the 1950 Census of
Housing indicate that there was still a long way to go toward the
qualitative improvement of then-existing housing. The substitution of
oil and gas for coal furnaces in central heating systems is still pro-
gressing. Radiant panel heating, already popular, and possibly the
development of solar heating will require installation of new pipes and
other equipment. Many of the smaller houses built after World War II
were constructed for possible expansion by completion of unfinished
second stories or in other ways. In the improvement of existing struc-
tures, as well as in new construction, air conditioning looms fairly large
as an outlet for investment.
A large number of the older structures are, of course, too far gone or
in neighborhoods too deteriorated to make the installation of such facili-
ties economical or even desirable. However, a substantial proportion
of existing housing can and will be improved along these lines if past
experience is any guide.
Financial Implications
As was observed before, an increase of real capital formation in resi-
dential real estate is quite possible. Even if a decline should occur, how-
ever, it does not follow that there would be a corresponding movement
in the demand for capital funds and particularly for debt financing. The
demand for capital funds originating in new residential building will
be determined by construction expenditures in current dollars rather
than in real terms. These expenditures in the past have shown a secular
rise although the rate of increase has slowed down (Chapter III).
Thus, if the secular price rise for new construction continues, larger
amounts of funds will probably be required in the long run, unless one
assumes a wholly unreasonable rate of decline on the real side.
The demand for debt financing will also be conditioned by the future
proportions of mortgage and equity funds used in the acquisition of
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been a secular trend toward the use of a greater proportion of mortgage
funds. This trend cannot continue indefinitely, of course, and serious
questions may be raised as to whether any further increase in the
proportion of debt financing would be sound. Nevertheless, the average
ratio of mortgage funds to total expenditures for construction and
land—roughly 75percent in recent years—might still increase, par-
ticularly under the impact of intensified federal credit aids, which will
be discussed in the next chapter.
Moreover, the demand for mortgage funds will be influenced by
many other factors: prices and turnover of existing real estate facilities,
the ratio of debt financing to equity financing in the acquisition of
old as well as new housing, the volume and financing of additions and
alterations, and trends in interest rates and other contract terms. The
growth in the residential mortgage debt will also be affected by the
rate of repayments of loans, and in the short run by the rate of fore-
closures as well.
The analysis in Part B has indicated that there is no invariant rela-
tionship between the volume of housekeeping residential construction
and increases in the residential mortgage debt, although the financing
of new construction has been the strategic factor in the growth of debt.
Some evidence was found of long-term decline in the importance of
new construction for the growth of debt, relative to the demand on
funds made by transactions within the existing stock of facilities
(Chapter XII). As the housing stock increases in size and the ratio of
additions to the total inventory diminishes, as it probably will, mort-
gage loans on existing residential real estate—for purchase, refinancing,
and additions and alterations—may become more important as outlets
for investible funds. Moreover, the tendency toward "packaged" home
mortgages which include consumers' durables in the house as well as
the real estate proper will raise the demand for mortgage funds asso-
ciated with a given volume of new residential construction expendi-
tures. Finally, the financing of nonhousekeeping residential construction
and of seasonal housing is likely to absorb more funds relative to house-
keeping construction if the previous observations on the probable
long-term increase in demand for these facilities prove to be correct.
Although debt financing of the acquisition of new residential real
estate has been carried rather far, the facts remain that recent ratios of
mortgage debt to the total value of the housing stock are still below
past peak values (Chapter XI) and that according to the 1950 Housing
Census less than half of the owner-occupied dwellings standing were
mortgaged, with a median ratio of debt to value on mortgaged homes
of about 42 per cent. Thus, given a high rate of turnover of existing
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of mortgaged homes and the average debt-to-value ratio—no matter
what one's judgment on the desirability of such a development might
be. One of the factors in the past growth of residential mortgage debt
has been the greater willingness of home purchasers to incur debt and
of lenders to advance funds on the security of mortgages, and it would
be unrealistic to assume that this trend has run its course.
The historical record shows that the residential mortgage debt has
represented a sharply growing proportion of the total private long-term
debt, increasing from 15 per cent in 1916 to 45 per cent in 1952, in spite
of the decline in the ratio of new residential construction expenditures
to total gross capital formation (in current as well as constant prices).
In other words, while the production of new residential assets has
diminished in importance relative to the production of other capital
assets, the use of debt funds in residential real estate has increased rela-
tive to the use of such funds in other sectors of the economy. If the
probable developments in residential financing, which were sketched in
the paragraphs above, hold, the residential mortgage debt is likely to
become even more important in the total private long-term debt. But
the future ratio of the residential to the total debt will, of course, be
determined by trends of debt financing in other sectors of the economy
as well as the residential sector.
The position of financial institutions in residential mortgage lending
will be enhanced to the extent that the share of noninstitutional lend-
ing activity continues to decline. In spite of the historical increase in
the share of financial institutions in total residential mortgage debt
since 1890 (Chapter XIII), individuals and miscellaneous lenders still
account for about one-fifth of aggregate holdings. It is unlikely that
they will ever be completely replaced by financial institutions, if for
no other reason than because home owners often accept purchase
money mortgages when they sell their houses. But low mortgage
interest rates, compared with yields on other investments, and the
general adoption of amortized loans will probably continue to reduce
the interest of individual investors in this field. On the other hand,
pension and similar funds which may be expected to increase sharply
in the long run are likely to expand their residential mortgage holdings
and may compete more actively with established types of financial
institutions.
Considering all these forces, residential mortgage financing will
continue to make large and probably growing demands on funds
available for investment, and particularly on the funds of financial
institutions. Another important factor in future potentials for mortgage
investment in residential construction, however, will be the role of
government, which is discussed in the next chapter.